Chairman Hall, Ranking Member Buyer, and Members of the Subcommittee, I am honored to provide this testimony on behalf of the National Veterans Legal Services Program (NVLSP).

NVLSP is a nonprofit veterans service organization founded in 1980 that has been assisting veterans and their advocates for thirty years.  We publish numerous advocacy materials, recruit and train volunteer attorneys, train service officers from such veterans service organizations as The American Legion and Military Order of the Purple Heart in veterans benefits law, and conduct quality reviews of the VA regional offices on behalf of The American Legion.  NVLSP also represents veterans and their families on claims for veterans benefits before VA, the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC), and other Federal courts. 

Our testimony is primarily based on reviews of over a thousand VA regional office decisions during our work with The American Legion (Legion), for whom we conduct quality reviews of VA regional offices.  We have also spoken with current and former VA employees, including a former senior VA manager who is now working as a service officer, and with other veterans service officers.  We also speak from the benefit of having reviewed hundreds of VA claims files in connection with our representation of veterans and their survivors at the Board and the Court.

We acknowledge that there are many generally equally effective ways to train VA adjudicators.  Our intent is not to micromanage the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) but to provide the subcommittee with information and ideas concerning the training of VA’s Claims Processing personnel, so that those responsible for making decisions on benefit claims learn to take appropriate actions to develop claims and make legally correct and fair decisions, resolving all reasonable doubt in favor of the veteran or claimant as required by law.

Our suggestions as to training are as follows:

• First, many VA errors may be caused by the perceived need to adjudicate quickly and not by lack of knowledge on the part of raters.  Investing taxpayer money in better VA training programs may be a waste if VA management continues to overemphasize production over quality.
• Second, well-trained first-line supervisors are needed throughout the system. When immediate supervisors don’t have sufficient technical experience and cannot answer the questions of those they supervise, the quality of decisions declines.
• Third, the VA should make better use of decision review officers’ (DRO) experience to identify widespread problems and poorly-trained employees.
• Fourth, the VBA must develop and use a package of trainings targeted to end the VA’s most common error patterns.  There should be proactive interaction between management and staff regarding these error patterns that are repeated over and over in case after case. 
• Fifth, the VA must change the anti-training attitude of some VA managers.
• Finally, training modules should be retrofitted and tailored to the experience level of the trainee.

1. Many VA Errors may not be caused by a Lack of Effective Training but by VA Management’s Overemphasis on Production.

We acknowledge that the VA is faced with a very difficult task.  Obviously, good training is essential if the VA wishes to produce a quality product.  However, our experience is that many VA errors seem to be caused by the perceived need to adjudicate claims quickly and not by an actual lack of knowledge.  For example, one common VA error is that conditions that appear to be secondary to service-connected type 2 diabetes are often not caught and rated.  It is difficult to believe that most VA raters do not know that diabetes can cause these common secondary conditions.  It is the opinion of NVLSP that because the extra work that is required to generate a decision on secondary service connection might not receive work credit, secondary service connection issues remain unadjudicated.

2. Immediate Supervisors Should Have Technical Expertise

Immediate supervisors should have sufficient technical experience to answer the questions of employees they supervise.  For example, a rater who inquires whether a VA examination is required in a particular case should be able to rely on the knowledge and guidance of their supervisor as to whether a VA exam is warranted.  The supervisor should be able to answer that question.  If not, the rater may begin to believe that technical expertise is unimportant, to cut corners, and to make his or her decisions without adequate knowledge and direct supervision. 

3.  Use DROs to Identify Problem Areas and Poorly-Trained Employees

There were originally two reasons for the DRO program.  First, the program was designed to give veterans de novo review and hopefully reduce the number of appeals.  Second, DROs were to identify problem areas among decision makers and to identify poorly-trained employees.  This second reason for the DRO program could be a very effective training tool.  However, in the experience of NVLSP, in some ROs the DRO knowledge base is not being used consistent with this original objective.  When a DRO decides upon de novo review to grant the benefit, the DRO should be required or encouraged to use their special skills and knowledge to explain their thought process to the rater so that this type of error does not recur.  These errors can be discussed in trainings so that raters learn from DROS and DRO decisions and begin to gain the knowledge base that sets DROs apart from and ahead of other VA decision-makers. 

4. Identify Major Error Patterns and Generate Interactive Trainings to End these Error Patterns

There should be strong and focused interaction between management and staff regarding error patterns that are repeated over and over in case after case.  The VBA must develop and use a package of trainings targeted to put an end to common error patterns.  This is absolutely crucial -- these errors “muck up” the VA adjudication system for years on end, often require multiple appeals and multiple remands, waste thousands of tax dollars, and frustrate many deserving veterans up until the day of their death. 

As the members of this subcommittee are aware, many veterans die with their claims for VA benefits not finally decided.  In many cases, this occurs because the VA has failed to stem a tide of relatively simple development errors.  It has failed to properly identify these errors and properly train employees to vigilantly guard against these errors.  For example, the VBA’s Office of Performance Analysis and Integrity releases data compiled from VACOLS regarding the reasons for remand of claims from the BVA to the ROs or the AMC.  Figures from the first quarter of FY 2010 show that about 3,200 claims were remanded because of problems with a VA medical examination or opinion; over 2,300 claims were remanded because the ROs failed to obtain all VA medical records relevant to the appealed case; and over 1,100 claims were remanded because a VA examination was not provided where warranted.  These cases all involve a premature decision—“premature” meaning “occurring before a state of readiness or maturity has arrived.”  As noted earlier, this problem with “premature” VA decisions may be partially caused by VA management’s overemphasis on production numbers—but whatever the cause, VA employees should be trained to recognize and combat these errors.

In addition to the above errors, some of the major errors identified by Legion quality review teams and review of files on appeal include the failure to consider conditions secondary to type 2 diabetes mellitus, the under-evaluation of mental disabilities, and the failure to consider claims that should have been inferred.  Testimony from other veterans service organizations point out many methods that VBA can use to compile a comprehensive list of common errors.  As noted earlier, some of these common errors may be caused by the VA’s emphasis on production and work credit over quality.  Some may be caused by the rater’s or DROs’ lack of understanding of legal requirements.  In particular, we find the large number of claims involving the under-evaluation of mental disabilities striking and suggest that any list of common errors include the under-evaluation of mental conditions.

5.         Change the Anti-Training Attitude of Some Managers

Some VA managers see training requirements as just one more impediment to meeting production numbers.  These managers are not anti-training so much as they are pro-production.  Their perception is that it is preferable to meet production goals than to take training requirements seriously.  Unfortunately, the attitude of such managers could defeat even the most ambitious, perfect, and comprehensive program of education and training.  The cure for this problem attitude has little to do with improving training.  Instead, the VA management must change its overemphasis on work credit and production and give equal emphasis to quality, full development of evidence, and resolving all reasonable doubt in favor of the veteran or claimant as required by law.

6. Tailor Trainings to the Experience Level of the Trainees

A Government Accountability Office Report first released in April 2010 and revised in September 2010 recommended that the VA “develop and implement a written strategy for routinely assessing the appropriateness of the training regional offices provide to experienced claims processors.”  In its comments, the VA generally concurred with GAO’s conclusions and concurred with all of GAO’s recommendations.  It goes without saying that trainees should receive training that is commensurate to their level of experience, and we encourage the subcommittee to ensure strong oversight of this area. 

We are particularly concerned that the more experienced claims processors continue to receive training at a level appropriate to their expert knowledge, skills and abilities.  With nearly one-half of the VA workforce having less than three years of experience, providing high-level training to experts might easily fall by the wayside.  Those with considerable expertise are perhaps the most valuable VA employees because due to this expertise many veterans enjoy the benefit of quick and correct decisions on their benefit claims.  To prevent these more experienced claims processors from gaining even greater knowledge would be shameful.  To allow them to stagnate or lose their edge due to deficiencies in the training system would also be shameful.  Therefore, we encourage the subcommittee to ensure supervision and oversight in this area.

I appreciate the opportunity to provide the Subcommittee with this testimony and stand ready to answer any questions the members may have.  Thank you.