H.R. 5954 – To grant presumption of service connection to veterans of Project 112, including Project SHAD.

Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee for allowing me to testify today on my legislation, H.R. 5954, to grant presumption of service connection to veterans of Project 112, including Project SHAD.

I would also like to thank Representative Mike Thompson, who has been a tireless advocate on this issue.  It has been my pleasure to work with him to bring these tests to light and fight to get Project 112/SHAD veterans the benefits they deserve.

When I was first elected to the House of Representatives in 2001, I was approached by Billings resident John Olsen.  John told me a disturbing tale of a government refusing to be accountable for its actions, a long line of healthcare problems, and a lack of care. 

In the early Cold War era, the Department of Defense and other federal agencies conducted a series of tests called Project 112.   During these projects, a number of weapons containing chemical and biological agents such as VX nerve gas, Sarin Nerve Gas and E. Coli were tested on unknowing military personnel.  John is one of the victims.  Over the years, he has battled several health problems including skin cancer, prostate cancer, and an adrenal tumor the size of his fist.

Even worse, for more than 40 years the existence of these tests was denied by the Department of Defense (DoD), despite reports from participating veterans, like John, that they were being stricken with unusual diseases.  During that time, many of these veterans suffered and died while their government looked the other way.  Finally, in 2001, the DoD acknowledged that the tests took place.  However, the Veterans Administration (VA) still wouldn’t provide these veterans with health benefits and compensation for their diseases.

Instead, the VA commissioned a study which was conducted by the Institute of Medicine.  Representative Thompson and I have questioned the validity of this study as it relates to the long term health effects on veterans of Project SHAD.  Without going into too much detail, the study did not accurately portray the method in which these tests were conducted, and did not include sailors from the light tug boats participating in the tests and which my constituent John Olson served on.  This was a deeply flawed study that should not be used as a basis to deny benefits to these veterans.

While working on this issue, I’ve been alarmed by the deficiency of the program for notifying Project SHAD veterans of their exposure.  Due to pressure from Congress, initial search efforts began in 2000; however, they were and continue to be inadequate bordering on negligent. 

Since 2003, the Department of Defense has stopped actively searching for individuals who were potentially exposed to chemical or biological substances during Project 112/SHAD.  At that time, the Department of Defense reported it had identified 5,842 servicemen and estimated another 350 civilians were exposed during these tests.

Since the 2003 report to Congress an additional 598 veterans of these tests have been identified as potentially exposed.  394 were found in the June 2007 Institute of Medicine study, 165 were provided by various veterans’ advocacy organizations, and another 39 were found through the Government Accountability Office’s efforts.  All told, since the Department of Defense stopped looking, 598 veterans have been identified, 10% of the original total.  Put simply, we do not know how many more veterans may be out there.

It is a true tragedy that our government, after exposing these servicemen and women to a witch’s brew of chemicals, cannot be bothered to find and notify them of such.

As I mentioned earlier, the Department of Defense did identify around 350 civilians who were potentially exposed during the course of these tests.  However, to date, no effort has ever been made to notify these civilians. 

H.R. 5954, in addition to the well-deserved presumption of service connection designation, would begin to draw a circle around the problem and correct it by implementing the recommendation from a February 2008 GAO report on Project SHAD.  The Department of Defense must reopen its search and notification efforts, or provide an adequate cost-benefit analysis as to why not.

This legislation will help set a standard of oversight for the federal government’s treatment of our soldiers.  We can’t sweep the suffering of these veterans under the rug. We can fix the problem created 40 years ago, and this legislation will do that.

Again, thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify.  And with unanimous consent I would also like to include the written statement of John Olson for the record.

[The statement of Mr. Olsen appears in the Submissions for the Record.]

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

"CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE:  DOD and VA Need to Improve Efforts to Identify and Notify Individuals Potentially Exposed during Chemical and Biological Tests: Chemical and Biological Defense"

February 2008, GAO-08-366

GAO Highlights

Why GAO Did This Study

Tens of thousands of military personnel and civilians were potentially exposed to chemical or biological substances through Department of Defense (DOD) tests since World War II. DOD conducted some of these tests as part of its Project 112 test program, while others were conducted as separate efforts. GAO was asked to (1) assess DOD’s efforts to identify individuals who were potentially exposed during Project 112 tests, (2) evaluate DOD’s current effort to identify individuals who were potentially exposed during tests conducted outside of Project 112, and (3) determine the extent to which DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) have taken action to notify individuals who might have been exposed during chemical and biological tests. GAO analyzed documents and interviewed officials from DOD, VA, the Department of Labor, and a veterans service organization.

What GAO Found:

Since 2003, DOD has stopped actively searching for individuals who were potentially exposed to chemical or biological substances during Project 112 tests, but did not provide a sound and documented basis for that decision. In 2003, DOD reported it had identified 5,842 servicemembers and estimated 350 civilians as having been potentially exposed during Project 112, and indicated that DOD would cease actively searching for additional individuals. However, in 2004, GAO reported that DOD did not exhaust all possible sources of information and recommended that DOD determine the feasibility of identifying additional individuals. In response to GAO’s recommendation, DOD determined continuing an active search for individuals had reached the point of diminishing returns, and reaffirmed its decision to cease active searches. This decision was not supported by an objective analysis of the potential costs and benefits of continuing the effort, nor could DOD provide any documented criteria from which it made its determination. Since June 2003, however, non-DOD sources—including the Institute of Medicine—have identified approximately 600 additional names of individuals who were potentially exposed during Project 112. Until DOD provides a more objective analysis of the costs and benefits of actively searching for Project 112 participants, DOD’s efforts may continue to be questioned.

DOD has taken action to identify individuals who were potentially exposed during tests outside of Project 112, but GAO identified four shortcomings in DOD’s current effort. First, DOD’s effort lacks clear and consistent objectives, scope of work, and information needs that would set the parameters for its effort. Second, DOD has not provided adequate oversight to guide this effort. Third, DOD has not fully leveraged information obtained from previous research efforts that identified exposed individuals. Fourth, DOD’s effort lacks transparency since it has not kept Congress and veterans service organizations fully informed of the progress and results of its effort. Until DOD addresses these limitations, Congress, veterans, and the American public cannot be assured that DOD’s current effort is reasonable and effective.

DOD and VA have had limited success in notifying individuals potentially exposed during tests both within and outside Project 112. DOD has a process to share the names of identified servicemembers with VA; however, DOD has delayed regular updates to VA because of a number of factors, such as competing priorities. Furthermore, although VA has a process for notifying potentially exposed veterans, it was not using certain available resources to obtain contact information to notify veterans or to help determine whether they were deceased. Moreover, DOD had not taken any action to notify identified civilians, focusing instead on veterans since the primary impetus for the research has been requests from VA. DOD has refrained from taking action on notifying civilians in part because it lacks specific guidance that defines the requirements to notify civilians. Until these issues are addressed, some identified veterans and civilians will remain unaware of their potential exposure.

What GAO Recommends

GAO suggests that Congress direct DOD to develop guidance to notify potentially exposed civilians.  GAO also recommends that DOD and VA take steps to improve their efforts to more effectively identify and notify individuals.  DOD and VA generally agreed with most of the recommendations.  However, DOD did not agree with the recommendation to conduct a cost-benefit analysis regarding additional Project 112 research.  As a result, GAO suggests that Congress direct DOD to conduct such an analysis.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on http://www.GAO-08-366. For more information, contact Davi M. D'Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov.