Good Morning Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee.  I appreciate this opportunity to speak with you on behalf of the Veterans Association of Sailors of the Vietnam War concerning the "Health Effects of the Vietnam War - The Aftermath."   I intend to address my remarks in support of those who have been left behind.  We continue to stand with all veterans Blue Water Navy, Blue Sky Air Force, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia veterans in seeking the enactment of H.R. 2254 so that benefits to all groups may be quickly restored.  Our friends and allies, the Australians, who fought beside us on land and at sea in Vietnam and every conflict subsequent to Vietnam, have taken the lead in granting Agent Orange benefits to those who served outside of the land mass of Vietnam.  They have also taken the lead in the scientific research in this field, which has recently been validated by our own Institute of Medicine.

By way of introduction, my name is John B, Wells and I am a retired Navy Commander as well as an attorney.  I entered the Navy in February of 1972 and was commissioned an Ensign in June of 1973.  In June of 1974 I completed the Main Propulsion Assistant course and was assigned to the USS Holder (DD-819) as Main Propulsion Assistant.  Ships of that class served frequently on the gun line off the coast of Vietnam in its territorial waters.   The ship's distilling plant/evaporators (hereinafter distillers)  were part of the equipment under my purview.  In October of 1976 I transferred to the USS Coronado, (LPD 11) also as Main Propulsion Assistant.  In the fall of 1977 I was reassigned as Chief Engineer after that Engineer was detached for cause.  I guided the ship through a successful Operational Propulsion Plant Examination.  Again, the ship's distillers were part of the equipment under my purview.  Later I was asked to oversee the preparation of the ship's repair plan for the upcoming shipyard overhaul.  While I was onboard, the ship deployed to the Caribbean and to the Mediterranean.

After a two year shore assignment, I was assigned to the Surface Warfare Officers School Department Head Course.  That course included several months of engineering training as well as combat systems and fundamentals.   I was assigned to the USS Badger (FF-1071) as Operations Officer.  I was also in charge of the ship's shipyard overhaul.  When the Badger's Chief Engineer was fired, I was assigned to that position.  Again, the ship's distillers were part of the equipment under my purview.  I guided the ship through a successful Light Off Examination and Operational Propulsion Plant Examination.  In 1982, I was assigned to the USS Worden, (CG-18) as Chief Engineer.  I was responsible for the ship's distillers.  Worden made deployments to the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean and the North Arabian Sea. 

In late 1984, I was reassigned to the staff of the Commander Naval Surface Reserve Force.  My responsibilities included the operation and scheduling for nineteen ships of the Naval Reserve Force.  In 1987, I was assigned to the pre-commissioning unit of Battleship Wisconsin (BB-64) as Main Propulsion Assistant.  I served as Acting Chief Engineer for a number of months until the Engineer reported.  Again, the ship's distillers were part of the equipment under my purview.   I was later reassigned as Executive Officer (second in command) of the USS Puget Sound (AD-38).  Puget Sound's mission was the repair of other ships.  The ship deployed to the North Atlantic and Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf while I was on board.

In 1989 I was reassigned as Commanding Officer, Naval Reserve Readiness Center Pittsburgh, PA.  At this time I began attending law school during the evening.  Part of my responsibilities was the training of over 1000 reservists.  We developed many training courses including engineering courses to include ship's distillers.  I retired from the Navy, as a Commander on 1 August, 1994.  I graduated from Duquense Law School with a Juris Doctor approximately 6 weeks prior to my retirement.

In the Navy I was qualified as a Surface Warfare Officer, Officer of the Deck (underway), Combat Information Center Watch Officer, Command Duty Officer, Tactical Action Officer, Navigator, and Engineering Officer of the Watch.  I was also qualified for command at sea.  I received a mechanical engineering subspecialty based on significant experience.  My ships operated with units of the Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy.   This included NATO exercises, RIMPAC exercises and other multi-national exercises and global operations.

The history of the blue water Navy tragedy begins in Australia.  In the late 1990's, the Australian Department of Veterans Affairs noticed a significant number of Agent Orange related cancers in Royal Australian Navy veterans who had never set foot on land in Vietnam.  Dr. Keith Horsley of the Australian Department of Veterans Affairs met Dr. Jochen Muller of the National Research Centre for Environmental Toxicology and the Queensland Health Services (hereinafter NRCET) at a conference in Stockholm.  Dr. Horsley addressed the phenomena with Dr. Mueller who agreed to conduct a study to explore the reasons for this apparent dichotomy.  Dr. Horsley arranged for funding from the Australian Department of Veterans Affairs and commissioned NRCET to explore the mystery.  Their report, entitled the Examination of The Potential Exposure of Royal Australian Navy (RAN) Personnel to Polychlorinated Dibenzodioxins And Polychlorinated Dibenzofurans Via Drinking Water, (NRCET study) was published in 2002.  I have talked with the authors of that report via telephone and e-mail.  My wife, who is a Louisiana notary and paralegal, and also an Australian native, traveled to Brisbane to interview the authors of the report.    

At about the same time the NRCET report was published, the American Department of Veterans Affairs issued a change to their Adjudication Procedures Manual (M21-1 Manual) that deleted those soldiers, sailors and airmen who did not set foot on land in Vietnam from the presumption of herbicide exposure.  This decision later led to the litigation discussed below. 

As a threshold matter, the vessels of both Australian and American origin operated side by side in the waters adjacent to Vietnam.  The missions were driven by the ship capabilities and not by nationality.  There was no tactical differences between the operations conducted by ships of the United States and Royal Australian Navy.

The NRCET  study noted that ships in the near shore marine waters collected waters that were contaminated with the runoff from areas sprayed with Agent Orange.  NRCET Study at 10.  The authors later reported to this office that estuary containing the dioxins extended more than three nautical miles from shore.   This means that the contamination would have extended well past the gun line which was normally located 2000 to 5000 yards from shore.  The distilling plants aboard the ship, which converted the salt water into potable drinking water, actually enhanced the effect of the Agent Orange.  NRCET Study at 42.  The study found that there was an elevation in cancer in veterans of the Royal Australian Navy which was higher than that of the Australian Army and Royal Australian Air Force.  NRCET Study at 13.  This was confirmed by the  "The Third Australian Vietnam Veterans Mortality Study" (hereinafter 2005 Mortality Study).  The NRCET Study at page 35 noted significant concentrations at Vung Tau, an area visited by Australian and American ships.  Theories that the Agent Orange stopped at the water's edge are simply preposterous. Congress in enacting the Clean Water Act recognized that pollutants discharged from shore will contaminate the navigable waters, waters of the contiguous zone, and the oceans. Anecdotal evidence reports Agent Orange in the waters of the rivers which then empty out into harbors and eventfully the estuaranine waters.  Sailors aboard the HMAS Sydney noted that brown water runoff would go many kilometers out to sea. 2005 Mortality Study at 196.  Da Nang harbor was identified as a serious Agent Orange "hot spot."   Anecdotal evidence noted that clouds of Agent Orange were blown out to sea.  Approximately 10-12 percent of the land area was sprayed with Agent Orange.  In contrast everyone aboard a ship that distilled contaminated water from estuarine sources was exposed. 

The distillers all work on similar principles to produce water (feed water) for the boilers and potable water for the ship's crew.  Water is introduced from the sea and is passed through the distilling condenser and air ejector condenser where it acts as a coolant for the condensers.  It is then sent through the vapor feed heater into the first effect chamber and into the second effect chamber where it is changed to water vapor.  Vapor then is passed through a drain regulator into a flash chamber and passes through baffles and separators into the distilling condenser where it is condensed into water and pumped to the ship's water distribution system.  Sea water not vaporized is pumped over the side by the brine pump.  Id.  This is the same process discussed in the NRCET Study.  It was used by American, British and Australian ships.  In fact many Royal Australian Navy ships were retired United States Navy ships or ships of the same class as the American ships.   Those that were not of American design were often constructed by the British.  They all used the same system.  This system was used well into the 1990's.  More recently a new system, reverse osmosis, is being adopted, but that did not see service during the Vietnam War.

Potable water was manufactured continuously along with "feed" water for the ship's boilers.  It was a constant headache and as a Chief Engineer there were many times that I was given round the clock hourly briefings on the status of water.  This was especially true in southern latitudes such as Vietnam since the higher ambient sea water temperatures reduced the efficiency of the distilling process.

As discussed in the NRCET Study the distilling process enhanced the effect of the dioxin.   Additionally the dioxin was ingested orally through drinking water, food, oral hygiene etc.  On land, the dioxin, once sprayed, would become embedded in the soil.  Since the water systems of the ships would have been thoroughly contaminated, the dioxin would have adhered to piping and continued to contaminate in an ever increasing amount.  The authors confirmed this in their discussions with my office.  The cumulative effect of the contamination would have resulted in a very high concentration.  It would have taken weeks and perhaps months to completely flush the system once the ship moved away from contaminated waters.  The Australian study confirmed the enhancing effects of the shipboard distilling plants.  NRCET Study at 42.  In other words, the effect was even more pronounced than if the veteran had merely ingested Agent Orange by breathing it or by drinking water from a contaminated stream. 

In their publication in the Federal Register, Vol. 73, No. 73, of April 15, 2008, the Department of Veterans Affairs complained that the NRCET study was not peer reviewed.  Actually it was peer-reviewed and published.  The report was presented to the 21st International Symposium on Halogenated Environmental Organic Pollutants and POPs in Gueongu Korea on 9-14 September 2001.  It was them published in Volume 52 of Organohalogen Compounds (ISBN 0-9703315-7-6) which is published by Dr. Jae Ho Yang, Catholic University of Daegu, Korea.  Please see http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:95837 (last visited June 13, 2008). More importantly, the study was prepared at the request of and for the Australian Department of Veterans Affairs who accepted the study.  The study was cited in "The Third Australian Vietnam Veterans Mortality Study" (hereinafter 2005 Mortality Study) published in 2005 by the Department of Veterans' Affairs and Australian Institute of Health and Welfare and resulted in the Department's consideration of Royal Australian Navy Vietnam Veterans as potentially exposed Vietnam Veterans.  The study was further reviewed at the request of the Institute of Medicine's Agent Orange Committee, by Dr. Steven Hawthorne of the University of North Dakota.  He certified that the NRCET study was scientifically viable and that the conclusions, based on Henry's Law were correct. 

In their Federal Register article, the DVA asserted that:

 "VA's scientific experts have noted many problems with this study that caution against placing significant reliance on the study. In particular, the authors of the Australian study themselves noted that there was substantial uncertainty in their assumptions regarding the concentration of dioxin that may have been present in estuarine waters during the Vietnam War." 

This is a blatant misrepresentation of the author's position.   When Dr. Caroline Gaus, one of the report's author was questioned on this point, she replied as follows:

"The problem referred to in this comment is associated with estimating the exposure level of Vietnam Veterans, not with the study's primary finding that exposure to dioxins was likely if (i) drinking water was sourced via distillation and (ii) the source water was contaminated. As highlighted by the authors, the exact level of exposure via this pathway is uncertain due to the lack of data on contaminant levels in the source water during the Vietnam War. The attempt made by the study to estimate the level of exposure serves only as an indication that exposure may have been considerable (and depends on the concentrations in the source water). Hence, the problem lies in the lack of exposure information, not with the study. The study clearly demonstrates that if source water is contaminated, dioxins are expected to co-distill with drinking water.

This issue is also not related to the study's quality, but rather highlights one of its findings out of context. The study noted that, while increasing suspended sediment loads in the source water decrease the co-distillation of dioxins, dioxins still co-distill with water at the highest level of suspended sediment in the water tested (i.e. at 1.44 g/L 38 percent of 2,3,7,8-TCDD co-distilled in the first 10 percent of source water). If 10 percent of the source water is distilled, TCDD would enrich in the drinking water by a factor of almost 4 compared to the source water. This was confirmed by using water from a tropical estuary with naturally high suspended sediment loading, where 48-60 percent of TCDD co-distilled with the first 10 percent of source water.

As noted above and in the study itself, estimating the level of exposure via this pathway is difficult due to the lack of data on the concentrations of dioxins in the source water. The level of exposure would depend strongly on the dioxin concentrations in the source water (which would have varied from location to location) as well as on the amount and duration of water consumed for drinking and/or cooking.

The study attempted to provide an estimate on the concentrations of dioxins in source water (0.043-0.69 ng/L). While the uncertainty around this value is large (approximately in the order of a factor of 10 or more), it cannot be determined whether it represents an over- or underestimate (which would also depend on location). Hence, it would be difficult to determine whether the level of exposure was similar, higher or lower compared to veterans who served on land. However, the study demonstrates that exposure is likely to have occurred if source water was contaminated and suggests that exposure may have been considerable.

Notably the study Identification of New Agent Orange/Dioxin Contamination Hot Spots in Southern Viet Nam Final Report conducted by Hatfield Consultants in 2006 noted significant hot spots in the land and waters internal to Vietnam, including Da Nang harbor.  Concentration levels were still significant, over thirty years after the end of the war. 

The DVA Federal Register comment contained the curious remark that one had to assume that the sailors drank only the contaminated water and only for an extended period of time.  That is a safe assumption.  All Navy ships, manufacture potable drinking water from sea water.  This water is replenished almost daily.  These ships did not have the capacity to carry potable water throughout the voyage without replenishment via their distillers.  These ships patrolled the entire coast of Vietnam and often anchored in harbors to provide gunfire support.  To infer that these ships never steamed through contaminated waters is naive.  Additionally, there was no means to transport large quantities of water outside of the reserve potable water tanks.  Nor was there a long water hose connecting the ship with Hawaii.

As previously discussed the NRCET study was cited in the 2005 Mortality Study.  That study was conducted by the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare for the Australian Department of Veterans Affairs.  It found a 19 percent increase in mortality for Navy veterans over the Australian population. This is despite the fact that mortality among Vietnam veterans as a whole was lower than the general Australian community.  In another study, the Cancer Incidence in Vietnam Veterans 2005 (hereinafter the 2005 Cancer  Study),the Australian Department of Veterans Affairs again cited the NRCET study.  The 2005 Cancer Study  found that Royal Australian Navy veterans had the highest rate of cancer, higher than expected by 22-26 percent, followed by Army veterans, higher than expected by 11-13 percent and Air Force veterans with  a 6-8 percent higher than the expected rate of cancer.   Navy and Army veterans showed a higher than the expected incidence of cancers of the colon, oral cavity, colon, pharynx and larynx and cancers of the head and neck and gastrointestinal.  Whereas Navy veterans demonstrated a higher than the expected incidence of gastrointestinal cancer, Army and Air Force veterans showed higher than the expected incidence of Hodgkin's disease and prostate cancer. The cancers unique to the Navy would appear to support the ingestion of the dioxin orally rather than nasally. 

Notably, cancer in Navy veterans could not be attributed to the ship on which they served or the time spent in Vietnamese waters.  This would indicate, I believe, that the contamination of the waters was extensive and the contamination of the water storage and distribution system long lasting.  Although the passage of time as made it impossible to produce direct proof, the circumstantial evidence is certainly compelling,

The Australians have stepped forward and began granting benefits to those who had served (i) on land in Vietnam, (ii) at sea in Vietnamese waters, or (iii) on board a vessel and consuming potable water supplied on that vessel, when the water supply had been produced by evaporative distillation of estuarine Vietnamese waters, for a cumulative period of at least thirty days.   They have defined Vietnamese waters as an area within 185.2 kilometers from land (roughly 100 nautical miles).  In reliance upon the NRCET Study, they began promulgating Statements of Principles, which are similar to our Code of Federal Regulations, covering various cancers. For several years now, Australian Navy veterans have been receiving benefits denied to their American counterparts.

In the summer of 2008, I presented to the Institute of Medicine's (IOM) Committee to Review the Health Effects in Vietnam Veterans of Exposure to Herbicides (Seventh Biennial Update) in San Antonio Texas.  We provided them with copies of the NRCET study, the VA's Federal Register notice and reclamas by myself and Dr. Gaus.  The IOM Committee conducted an exhaustive review of the NRCET study and requested an independent review by Dr. Steve Hawthorne who is the Senior Research Manager of the Energy & Environmental Research Center (EERC), University of North Dakota.  Dr.  Hawthorne's principal areas of interest and expertise include environmental chemistry and analysis, and supercritical and subcritical (superheated) fluid extraction.  After reviewing the NRCET study, Dr. Hawthorne reported:

. . . that leaves two questions to be answered:

1. Is there a physiochemical basis to expect that non-polars (like the dioxins) would distill, while polars (like dimethylarsenic acid) do not distill?

2. Do their experiments confirm expectations based on physiochemical parameters that dioxins distill and DMA does not?

The answers to both questions are definitely yes. An explanation of these results can be based on Henry's law—i.e., the tendency of a solute to evaporate from water. This tendency is enhanced by high vapor pressure (obviously), but also by low water solubility. Thus, even molecules like 2,3,7,8-TCDD that have high boiling points will evaporate from water because their solubility is so low. Conversely, molecules like DMA that are very soluble in water do not evaporate from water.  The fact that non-polar molecules (even those with high boiling points) evaporate from water is well-known in environmental science, and has been demonstrated to occur with a broad range of pollutants such as PCBs, PAHs, organochlorine pesticides, as well as dioxins. For example, the EPA estimates that the half-life for evaporation of 2,3,7,8-TCDD from a pond is 46 days. The distillation process greatly enhances this process by adding heat and reducing the pressure.  The experiments described confirm expectations based on Henry's law that dioxins would be concentrated in the distillate, while DMA would not. (The formation experiment was inconclusive, but I don't believe it is important to their conclusions.) Assuming that their apparatus mimics ship-board units (and that seems reasonable), the increased concentration of dioxins in distillate water should be accepted to a reasonable scientific certainty.

The IOM report accepted the proposition that Navy veterans off the coast were exposed and recommended that they be given the presumption of exposure.  In their recommendation, the IOM committee stated: "Given the available evidence, the committee recommends that members of the Blue Water Navy should not be excluded from the set of Vietnam-era veterans with presumed herbicide exposure."

Although the DVA accepted other recommendations from this IOM report, including the extension of benefits for ischemic heart disease, Parkinson's disease and B cell leukemia such as hairy cell leukemia.  Inexplicably The Department of Veterans Affairs refused to accept the IOM report, instead ordering another study by a different committee of the IOM to review areas previously addressed by the Agent Orange Committee and the Australians.  The study was commissioned in February of this year and is expected to take 18 months.  Meanwhile, our Navy veterans are dying of Agent Orange related diseases.

The Department of Veterans Affairs has undertaken a project to cover some blue water Navy veterans.  If a ship entered inland waters, such as a river, the presumption is granted.  This is a classic case of doing the right thing for the wrong reason.  It is doubtful that the distillers, designed to convert salt water to fresh would have been operating in the rivers.  More importantly, Navy regulations at the time stated potable water should not be distilled in rivers, streams etc.  This project, while covering a few more veterans, is a mere extension of the DVA's irrational "boots on the ground" requirement.  

This project is complicated by the difficulty in proving ships locations.  Logs are not always available and are handwritten.  Specific locations are not always identifiable.  Locations are often specified by directional bearings and/or ranges to navigational points that may no longer exist or may be called by a different name.  Personnel going ashore are never documented unless they are permanently reporting to or transferring from the command.  The project has resulted in a massive expenditure of time with little reward.

I would be remiss if I did not address the case of Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  I filed an amicus brief in Haas which centered on international law and the NRCET study.  The presumption issue in Haas was a secondary issue.  Actually Commander Haas was directly exposed from an airborne cloud. 

The Haas case was primarily decided on administrative law principles dealing with rulemaking.  In revising their M21-1 Manual, the DVA failed to follow the rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).  The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims found that the provision was irrational and not promulgated pursuant to law.  The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims had also ruled that the Department of Veterans Affairs's interpretation of the enabling statute, 38 U.S.C. ' 1116, which excluded the Navy veterans, was unreasonable and inconsistent. 

The Federal Circuit excused the VA's compliance with the rulemaking provisions of the APA. Acting on administrative law principles, it also reversed the Veterans Court holding that the DVA was not given sufficient deference in the way they interpreted the statute.  The Federal Circuit relied upon the  "Chevron doctrine,"  that states "when an agency invokes its authority to issue regulations, which then interpret ambiguous statutory terms, the courts defer to its reasonable interpretations."  In a split (2-1) decision, the Federal Circuit held that the DVA was entitled to Chevron deference because they found that the phrase "served in the Republic of Vietnam in section 1116 is ambiguous."  It was this curious finding which caused the predecessor of H.R. 2254 to be introduced in the last session, and H.R. 2254 in this session, to clarify the "ambiguous" language. 

In my amicus brief I raised the argument that the statutory language incorporated the territorial seas.  U.S. Navy ships, like their Australian counterparts, steamed within the territorial waters of Vietnam.  Territorial waters were historically defined as (1) the water area comprising both inland waters (rivers, lakes and true bays, etc.) and (2) the waters extending seaward three nautical miles from the coast line, i.e., the line of ordinary low water, (ofttime called the 'territorial sea'). Seaward of that three-mile territorial sea lie the high seas.  C. A. B. v. Island Airlines, Inc. 235 F.Supp. 990, 1007 (D.C.Hawaii 1964).  A wider area, the contiguous zone, reaches out to twelve miles from the coast.  United States v. Louisiana 394 U.S. 11, 23 n. 26. (1969). Vietnam claimed a 12 mile territorial sea limit, which defines its sovereignty.  That is consistent with the limitations of the United Nations Convention on the law of the Sea Article 3.  Three nautical miles is within the outermost range of the 5" 38 gun mounts of Destroyer type ships used in the Vietnam war.  Twelve nautical miles (24,000 yards) is beyond the maximum range of the most commonly used shipboard batteries, the 5"38 or the 5"54 naval gun.  The same holds true for the 6" and 8" guns.  Only the Battleship could provide support beyond 12 miles. 

The enabling statute, 38 U.S.C. ' 1116(a)(1)(A) recognizes a presumption of service connection when the veteran manifests an enumerated  disease, if the person was "a veteran who, during active military, naval, or air service, served in the Republic of Vietnam during the period beginning on January 9, 1962, and ending on May 7, 1975."   The threshold factors are the existence of a prescribed disease and service in Vietnam. 

In Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 1, 52 (1906), the Supreme Court held that the Mississippi Sound, and by extension the waters surrounding all harbors as inland waters, were under the category of "bays wholly within [the Nation's] territory not exceeding two marine leagues in width at the mouth."   Inland, or internal waters are subject to the complete sovereignty of the nation, as much as if they were a part of its land territory.  United States v. Louisiana, supra.   Thus the presumption should apply to any harbor as well as inland waters. The territorial waters to include the contiguous zone are also under the control of the sovereign nation, although innocent passage may not be denied.  Id.  Subject to the right of innocent passage, the coastal state, in this case Vietnam, has the same sovereignty over its territorial sea as it has with respect to its land territory.  See, 1958 Territorial Sea Convention Article 1-2; Law of the Seas Convention, Article 2. 

Thus any time a Navy ship was firing its guns ashore, it would have had to have been within the territorial waters of Vietnam.  When at anchor in a harbor, it was within the inland waters of Vietnam.  At all relevant times, the ship was within the sovereignty of Vietnam and therefore its crew "served in the Republic of Vietnam."  The distance to shore directly corresponds to the maximum range of the support of forces ashore.  Consequently, most naval units operated close to shore.   Gunfire missions were often shot from two to three  thousand yards of the shore, well within the three nautical mile limit.  Many were anchored in Da Nang Harbor.  The closer a ship was to the coast, the higher the possibility that they steamed through waters contaminated with Agent Orange.  In the case of the harbor anchorages, the ships were not only within the sovereign territory of Vietnam, they were within the inland waters.  Under both national and international law, most ships served in the Republic of Vietnam.  The Federal Circuit, in ruling on a petition for rehearing, refused to address the international law arguments stating that Mr. Haas had waived the argument by not presenting it at the Veterans Court.

After the submission of all briefs and a few days before the May 8, 2008 decision was rendered, the Department of Justice, acting on behalf of the DVA submitted a supplemental brief based on the erroneous April 15, 2008 Federal Register notice.  Although the information in that article has since been refuted, there was not sufficient time to respond to the supplemental brief.  This left the Court under the impression that the NRCET study had not been peer reviewed, that the Australians used different ships and distilling systems, that American ships did not make water and that the authors doubted their own study.  Those impressions were blatantly false, but this was not brought before the Court.   Although not a holding of the Court, the DVA misrepresentations were discussed in dicta and obviously had some impact on the decision. 

While this adversarial ploy was a brilliant tactical move, it was a reprehensible act by an agency who claims to stand as a non adversary to care for the veteran, his widow and orphan.  I am reminded of Justice Black's dissent in St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 229 (1961) "Our Government should not by picayunish haggling over the scope of its promise, permit one of its arms to do that which, by any fair construction, the Government has given its word that no arm will do. It is no less good morals and good law that the Government should turn square corners in dealing with the people than that the people should turn square corners in dealing with their government." 

These men left their homes to go to war.  It was an unpopular war, but they went.  There were teach-ins telling them how to dodge the draft or flee to Canada.  But they went. When they returned they were spat upon and called the most terrible of names.  But they went.   These men were and are casualties of war.   Many have died and others are dying.  Their names will never go on the Wall, but they are casualties who have had or will have their lives cut short. In the midst of recession they are left without medical care.  Their families are left without support as they pass.  These men are heroes and we owe them medical care and a pension.

Currently Australia recognizes a presumption of exposure for all of those who served within the 185.2 kilometer radius of Vietnam for thirty days or more.  That is roughly the same area as the Vietnam Service Medal area.  While I am certainly happy that our Allies have taken the step of compensating and treating their Navy veterans, as an American, I am somewhat chagrined that we did not immediately follow suit.  As the leader of the Free World we should take the lead in taking care of our veterans.

It is impossible to provide direct evidence as to the dioxin content of the South China Sea and the waters off Vietnam in the 1960's and 1970's.  Too much time has passed to be able to make that determination.  The circumstantial case, however, is compelling.  The 2005 Mortality Study and Cancer Incidence Study identifiers an exposure problem unique to the Navy.  The NRCET study shows how exposure most probably occurred.  The type of cancers developed by Australian Navy veterans confirm that exposure did occur.

H.R. 2254 is designed to correct years of neglect and degradation.  It will restore earned benefits to these heroes and ensure that their families will receive a pension upon their premature death.  It will also implement the recommendations of the IOM's Agent Orange committee. This is not a gift.  It is not welfare.  It is an earned benefit bought and paid for with their health and their lives.  I urge this Committee to favorably report H.R. 2254 with a strong recommendation that it be sent to the full House for expedited passage.  Again thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today.  It is a great personal honor both to appear before you and to represent the  Navy heroes of the Vietnam War.  God bless our veterans and God bless the United States of America.