House Veterans’ Affairs Committee
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
March 17, 2004
John D. Halamka, MD, MS
CIO, Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center and Harvard Medical School
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of
the Subcommittee, I am Dr. John Halamka, the CIO of Beth Israel
Deaconess Medical Center and Harvard Medical School. I am grateful for
the opportunity to testify before you today on the creation, management
and exchange of both clinical and administrative electronic medical
records.
Exchanging Clinical Records via the Web
Introduction
The same technologies that send web pages from one site to another on
the public Internet can shape a private medical intranet that assembles
a “virtual” medical record that draws on sources of heterogeneous
information. But, barriers to creating virtual medical records on
intranets abound. Some are technical: correctly identifying patients,
guaranteeing data integrity, and protecting confidentiality. Some are
organizational: standardizing the types of information exchange,
providing appropriate sanctions for violation of security policies, and
obtaining patient consent for transmitting information among multiple
institutions.
Several groups have proposed solutions for such technical and
organizational challenges and have implemented systems that use
intranets to provide clinical information to health care providers. [Kohane,
Fraiser] This holds special impact for emergency departments that
constantly struggle with providing care based on incomplete information
about medical histories. To illustrate both the challenges and some
early solutions, we describe the early experiences with a live
implementation, CareWeb, that shares complete medical records
information between multiple healthcare organizations on a corporate
intranet.
The Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, the Joslin Diabetes Center,
two Boston area community hospitals, and several satellite outpatient
clinics have clinical affiliates that that required the integration of
existing electronic medical records. Each site has different clinical
computing systems, different institutional vocabularies, and varying
completeness of clinical information.
Beth Israel Deaconess stores clinical data and several related practices
in a comprehensive, custom built computing system [Bleich], while
clinical data at Joslin Diabetes Center resides in an industry standard
database. Our goal was to consolidate medical records “virtually” at
these heterogenous institutions, using the corporate intranet and to
make that information available to practitioners at the point of care.
CareWeb operates in response to a care provider who, using a standard
web browser, creates a query for information by specifying patient
identification. This information is submitted over the intranet to
CareWeb which, in turn, generates a request for information the Beth
Israel Deaconess, Joslin and community clinical computing systems. The
systems respond with demographics, problems, medications, and records of
allergies, notes, and visits. CareWeb interprets the incoming messages
and creates a single, unified presentation that it returns to the health
care provider as a series of web pages. Tool bars enable full
navigational control, allowing the medical record to be scanned using a
tab folder-like paradigm.
Barriers to using an intranet
Barriers, both technical and organizational, preclude a uniform
infrastructure for exchange of medical records on an intranet. To
exchange patient identified information among hospitals, even apparently
simple tasks, such as identifying the correct patient, can be a
challenge.
Identifying the patient
In the United States, there is no universal healthcare identifier to
identify individual patients. A logical approach is to use a combination
of demographic identifiers – such as name/date of birth/gender or social
security number. However, demographic identifiers are often mis-entered
or mis-reported, making patient identification a difficult problem.
Teich and colleagues at Partners Healthcare in Boston [Teich] found a 3%
discrepancy in birth month for known matched patients, and a 39%
discrepancy in last name. Another study [Goldberg] found a 2.4%
discrepancy in gender for known matched patients.
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (PL
104-191) [HIPAA] stipulates that Health and Human Services devise a
strategy for universal patient identification by 1998. Current
suggestions span the gamut from the social security number to the use of
long random numbers, unique to each individual. [Szolovits]
CareWeb uses a statistical probabilistic best match of name, gender,
date of birth and other demographics to group the medical record numbers
of each patient together into a community member index. All clinical
data resides in the clinical computing systems of each health care
facility, but the common patient index provides pointers to patient
specific information at each location. Beth Israel Deaconess, Joslin and
the Community Hospitals are electronically interfaced to this community
member index such that each new patient registration automatically
updates the index with patient demographic information, medical record
numbers and pointers to clinical data at each site.
Data format and Vocabulary
Medical records contain data elements that vary widely among hospital
systems, both in definition and in the amount of data available. To
exchange electronic medical records successfully, all partners involved
in the exchange must first define the uses for the data and then elect a
consistent set of elements most relevant to the intended use. For
example, a clinical emergency department application requires a set of
data far different from an application assaying managed care
eligibility. Data elements must also address potential legal and social
sensitivities. A patient may agree to share insurance authorization
information, but not HIV status.
Several standardized data sets have been suggested for emergent clinical
use, including the Center for Disease Control's Data Elements for
Emergency Department Systems (DEEDS) [Pollack], the Boston Collaborative
data set [Kohane], and the National Information Infrastructure Health
Information Network Emergency Medicine data set. [Barthell]
But even if partners agree on data elements to exchange and a consistent
way to request information, the data exchanged may not be easily
comparable. Hospital systems are heterogeneous, and most lack uniform
vocabulary. One hospital may list a diagnosis as “hypertension,” while
another may code the same diagnosis as “high blood pressure.” Similarly,
medication lists assembled from multiple hospitals might appear as
Naproxen Sodium, Naprosyn, and Aleve.
Vocabulary standards solve the problem of data comparability. ICD-9-CM
coding is one of those most familiar. By coding all medical records with
ICD-9-CM codes instead of physician-generated English descriptions,
hospital discharge records become comparable. The international
Systemized Nomenclature for Medical and Veterinary Medicine (SNOMED)
provides a comprehensive set of over 150,000 terms organized into twelve
categories – anatomy, morphology, normal/abnormal functions, symptoms or
signs, chemicals, drugs, enzymes, organisms, physical agents, spatial
relationships, occupations, social contexts, diseases, and procedures. [SNOMED].
The National Library of Medicine’s Unified Medical Language System (UMLS)
has concept identifiers that group these ICD-9 and SNOMED terms into a
single nomenclature. [Humphreys] The Logical Observation Identifier
Names and Codes (LOINC) provides a library of over 6500 clinical test
names or identifiers. [LOINC] Finally, the National Drug Code (NDC)
provides a standard dictionary of medications. Although most
institutions do not use all of these vocabularies, it is possible to
translate institution specific data into standard terminologies during
the presentation of medical information to clinicians. [Law]
At each hospital, a site-specific CareWeb program intercepts incoming
requests for information. These programs have knowledge of the computer
systems at each site and translate hospital specific information into
standard vocabularies – ICD-9-CM for diagnoses, NDC for drug
information, and LOINC for laboratory. Once translated into standard
vocabularies, messages are sent between CareWeb sites using Health Level
7 [HL7], a standard data format for medical information interchange.
Security/ Confidentiality
In his 2004 state of the Union address, President Bush noted that we
should implement interoperable electronic medical records to reduce
medical errors and healthcare costs. However, the security and
confidentiality implications of web-connecting the nation's clinical
data from a major impediment in realizing this goal. [Woodward, Rind]
In 1995, the National Research Council of the National Academy of
Sciences was charged with evaluating practical measures that can reduce
the risk of improper disclosure of confidential health information,
while providing appropriate access to those interested in improving
quality and reducing the cost of care. Their March 1997 report, "For the
Record: Protecting Electronic Health Information," presents the findings
of two years of collaborative investigations which delineate best
technical and organizational practices to protect patient
confidentiality [NRC]. Intranet medical record systems should
incorporate these recommendations, and recent legislation emphasizes the
need to implement strong security measures. For each unauthorized
disclosure, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (PL 104-191) [HIPAA] imposes a fine of up to $250,000 per incident,
and up to five days of imprisonment. In addition, failure to protect
patient information and patient privacy can result in loss of
accreditation. Implementation of this act is anticipated in mid-1998.
CareWeb incorporates all NRC guidelines for protecting health care
information and the techniques for this are discussed elsewhere. [Halamka]
Authentication
The authenticity of each CareWeb user is guaranteed with a strong
username and password. Passwords expire every 90 days, must be at least
6 characters in length and may not be English words.
Access Control
Once authorized, CareWeb determines each user's role from a database,
and this role is used to restrict access to specific areas of the
medical record. Currently, clinicians are allowed to examine the full
record, while registration clerks are limited to demographic
information.
Audit Trails
The security policy of the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center is to
provide auditing at the level of the specific patient queried and the
individual menu selections used. [Safran] CareWeb implements a complete
multi-organizational audit trail.
In any multi-institutional reporting system, there are two places to
capture the audit either at the institutional level where the
information is stored (the sites), or at the point where the information
is delivered. Careweb audit information is captured at the site level.
By storing audit trails at each site, each hospital can control and
audit the information that leaves its site, regardless of where it is
delivered. Each hospital site server captures patient identification
information, the requester, the requester's location, date, time, and
information requested. Although information is stored at the site level,
a multi-institutional auditing system that provides patients with the
details of the movement of their medical information throughout the
healthcare enterprise is available. The auditing query system has the
same hardware token authentication and access controls required for any
CareWeb healthcare data request. Once authenticated, an auditor enters
patient identification information and submits the information to the
CareWeb auditing system. It produces a consolidated report showing all
flows of information about the patient for all institutions.
Protection of External Communications
The existing hospital computing systems at all the healthcare facilities
connected to CareWeb employ a complex series of hardware controls that
limit direct connectivity to clinical servers from outside the
institution.
Encryption of Public Network Transmissions
For communications between data sources and CareWeb users, we
implemented a cryptographic system that incorporates industry standard
components for digital signature and encoding of messages, using the
most secure keys available.
Electronic Authentication of Records
CareWeb uses digital signature cryptography methods for all network
transmissions, ensuring the integrity of all health data delivered. The
NRC recommends an implementation of digital signature to ensure that
medical records are not changed on the individual systems where they are
stored. The CareWeb architecture provides a secure mechanism to
transport each institution's data and can guarantee that the data were
not changed during the retrieval process. Security policies of each
institution providing data dictate the reputability of the data.
Physical Security and Disaster Recovery
Multi-institutional architecture provides significant physical
protection for health data. Instead of physically locating all patient
records in a central data source vulnerable to physical disasters, the
CareWeb architecture creates a virtual record that is assembled on
demand and not stored in a central repository. Currently, all hospital
computers linked by CareWeb are geographically dispersed and are locked
in secure computer rooms accessed by electronic key code. The CareWeb
architecture depends upon the physical security and disaster recovery
practices of the individual sites that provide data. However, if any
sites sustain a disaster and cease to provide data, CareWeb notes that a
site is currently unavailable and provides a virtual medical record
comprised of all functioning sites.
Software Discipline
Web pages returned by CareWeb cannot be stored on local hard disks by
the browser. Three specific techniques are used to prevent such
behavior. The pages are given an expiration date of January 1, 1970 and
arrive “out of date.” The pages are sent with a special message
instructing the browser not to store them. Finally, the pages are sent
in a secure mode (secure sockets) which most browsers use as an
indicator to not store pages.
Discussion
Continuing reports of flaws in Internet security give a public
impression that internet technologies are not suitable for transmission
of sensitive information, and this creates difficulty in obtaining
institutional support. Consensus for deploying such a system must
include information systems personnel, hospital administrators,
patients, and clinicians.
Several groups are working to define data and security standards to
encourage the development of a national infrastructure for medical data
exchange, including HL7 (www.hl7.org), the EHR Collaborative (http://www.ehrcollaborative.org)
, and the NHII project (http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/nhii/).
Implementation of federal legislation mandating universal patient
identification combined with the efforts of researchers, public interest
groups, and industry fuels a rapid evolution of the infrastructure
required to exchange medical records using intranets. With an
appropriate balance between confidentiality and the need for clinical
information, an intranet-based system will benefit patients and
physicians and ultimately lead to better care.
Acknowledgements
Funded in part by a cooperative agreement with the Agency for Health
Care Policy and Research and the National Library of Medicine Sharing
Paperless Records Among Networks of Providers Grant (U01 – 08749).
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Exchanging Administrative Records via the Web
Overview
The New England Health EDI Network (NEHEN) was formed in 1998 by a
collaborative of non-profit payers and providers to implement HIPAA
administrative simplification for the region. Three of the provider
organizations, Partners Healthcare, CareGroup, and Lifespan helped found
NEHEN. Boston Medical Center joined in December 1999. UMassMemorial and
Children’s Hospital joined in February 2000. Tufts Health Plan, Harvard
Pilgrim Health Care, and Neighborhood Health Plan are the three payer
members exchanging HIPAA-compliant eligibility transactions. NEHEN also
provides connectivity to Medicaid and Medicare, which are affiliates
rather than members. Together, these payers insure more than 80% of all
people with healthcare coverage in Massachusetts.
Architecture
NEHEN is fundamentally different from the typical healthcare electronic
transaction models seen in the marketplace. Today, the electronic
solutions available generally fall into the payer proprietary model or
the clearinghouse model. In the payer proprietary model, the providers
conform to the specification provided by the payer, leading to a
different solution for each payer that a provider deals with. In the
clearinghouse model, the clearinghouse handles any translation between
the provider’s preferred data formats and that of the payers the
provider wishes to trade with. This model is typically funded through
per transaction fees.
In the NEHEN model, the participants agreed to the following guiding
principles that drove and continue to drive the architecture decisions:
• Standards-based approach
• Security and Privacy are of paramount concern
• Common program management
• Share innovation
One of the members initially developed the software used to route
transactions to the appropriate trading partner and then donated that
software to NEHEN, enabling the other members to quickly ramp up their
transaction volumes with minimal cost. Because the members feel that
their primary arena for competition is not in administrative costs, but
in clinical care, all are willing to collaborate on such tasks as
software development for the purpose of driving down costs.
To make concurrent development possible and to ensure HIPAA compliance,
the members agreed to implement their communications according to the
standards proposed by HIPAA. This approach allows all members to
implement the same base solution for each of their trading partners,
greatly reducing the overall cost of their EDI solution. In addition, by
relying solely on publicly available and universally recognized
standards, interested prospective members can easily estimate their cost
to join and begin trading. When those members join, the incremental cost
to the existing network to beginning trading is minimal because of the
standard approach.
In order to ensure privacy and security of the highly confidential data
being exchanged, the NEHEN members have implemented a private network
rather than using the Internet as the transport mechanism. In addition,
there is no central database that tracks or even counts the
transactions, thus all patient-identifiable data is transitory in
nature.
To get the greatest benefit out of electronic transactions, initiating
and reviewing them must be integrated into the standard workflow at
within a provider organization. This has meant integrating transaction
initiation and review into the Hospital Information Systems at each of
the large provider members. This integration ensures that it is easy for
employees to request information and use it when it is returned.
Work to date
When NEHEN formed, the members decided to concentrate first on
developing the eligibility inquiry and response transaction. Because
this transaction takes place at the beginning of the patient visit and
can lead to costly rework and write-off of claims if eligibility is not
verified, this was a natural first step. Eligibility has now been live
since June 1998 and the providers currently are making over 1 million
inquiries per month. With the addition of BMC, UMassMemorial, and
Children’s hospital and increased usage by existing members, NEHEN now
processes 2.1 million transactions per month (December 2003)
In addition to eligibility, NEHEN also provides referral, claims, claim
status and remittance transactions. As of the HIPAA deadline, October of
2003, all members in NEHEN were fully compliant with all mandated
transactions.
The typical return on investment for a new provider joining is measured
in months and will continue to decrease as the connectivity options that
NEHEN provides its members expand.
Future of NEHEN and Administrative Simplification
Over the past five years, NEHEN has focused first on implementing the
initial set of electronic transactions, and then on expanding its base
by recruiting other large provider organizations to join. Now that
several of the large providers have joined (BMC, UMassMemorial,
Children’s), NEHEN and its program managers are thinking about the best
way to expand effectively to allow smaller provider organizations the
potential administrative cost reductions that have been realized by
their larger cousins.
There are several potential solutions, with distinct options targeted at
the community hospitals, medium-sized physician practices, and
individual or very small physician practices. Any of the solutions,
however, can leverage the investment that the NEHEN members have made in
developing a standards-based, secure approach to administrative
simplification. Today, the NEHEN payers and, through NEHEN software, the
other major payers in Massachusetts, can respond to a standard
eligibility inquiry in less than a minute in a fashion that can be
integrated into the provider’s practice management or hospital
information system. In the future, NEHEN will continue to develop the
supported transactions, and it should also develop the connectivity
options for smaller providers because the existing connectivity solution
becomes unmanageable after the number of members expands much beyond ten
to fifteen.
Once these connectivity issues are solved, the end result in terms of
administrative cost reductions for the entire Massachusetts health care
system has the potential to be industry changing. The following example
of the “Life of a Claim” illustrates this point by describing the
differences that will take place once the electronic transactions NEHEN
is working to develop are a reality.
Life of a Claim before NEHEN
Patient A comes in to their primary care provider for their yearly
physical and forgets to bring her new insurance card showing that
because of a change in jobs, Patient A is now covered by Insurance B
rather than Insurance A as they were last year. Since eligibility is
difficult and time consuming to check without electronic means, the
registration clerk relies on the information already in the system about
Patient A to check her in.
After that day’s visit, the provider’s practice management system prints
claim for Patient A and it is sent to Insurance A, because that’s what
the patient had last year. After about one week of traveling through the
mail, the mailroom of Insurance A, and the sorting, scanning, and data
entry process at Insurance A, the claim is loaded into Insurance A’s
system.
That night, the claim bounces because Patient A is no longer covered.
Without an electronic means of claim status inquiry, the provider
doesn’t know this fact until they happen to call or Insurance A sends
out the monthly tape with updated claim status information.
After learning that Insurance A will not pay the claim, the provider
bills Patient A directly. Patient A receives the bill and if they are
conscientious, calls the provider immediately to inform them that
Insurance B is now their insurer. If Patient A is not so conscientious,
it can easily take 60 or 90 days before the provider learns that they
should have sent the claim to Insurance B initially.
By this time, even if the provider submits the claim to Insurance B,
there is no guarantee that Insurance B will pay the claim since it has
been so long since the date of service. Even if the claim is eventually
paid, it is very likely to need more intervention from the billing and
accounts payable departments in the provider and payer organizations
before it is complete. Finally a paper check will be cut and mailed to
the provider’s lockbox, adding another 4-5 days to the amount of time it
takes to be paid.
Overall, the current manual claims submission process results in the
average taking 100 or more days to be paid in Massachusetts.
Life of a Claim after NEHEN
With electronic eligibility, claim status inquiry, and claims
submission, the overall financial picture changes dramatically.
With the same situation as above, the following changes are immediate:
Patient A comes in for their physical without their card. While the
registration clerk is validating demographics like address and birth
date, their system automatically requests eligibility verification from
Insurance A. Before the registration is complete, Insurance A notifies
the provider that Patient A is not covered. At this point the
registration clerk can ask the patient what their correct Insurance
Carrier, another inquiry can be initiated, and the correct copay and
insurance are recorded.
That night, the practice management system submits the claim
electronically to Insurance B. Because the standard requires it, all
items on the claim are coded according to the national standard.
Later that night, Insurance B’s claims engine runs and suspends the
claim because one of their claims adjudication rules was violated. The
next day, the provider’s staff can use their electronic claims status
inquiry facility to check on the claim and if necessary, call to
proactively try to get the issue resolved.
After any issues are resolved, and many current issues are directly
related to problems solved by electronic access to data at the front end
of the process, the payer’s system sends electronic funds transfer
instructions to their bank and a payment remittance advice to the
provider.
Overall, with electronic access to data on the front end and electronic
claims submission available to every provider, it is a realistic
possibility for claims to be paid in three to five days rather than the
current 100 plus. Obviously, there is a great deal of work to be done to
the existing payers’ and providers’ systems to make this vision a
reality. However, with the NEHEN consortium already trading
standards-based common transactions, the framework is in place and ready
to be expanded.
Value of the NEHEN model to the Massachusetts healthcare system
There are several components to the value of NEHEN to the Massachusetts
healthcare system. The first is that because payer connectivity exists
for such a large proportion of the total covered market, providers can
quickly see a return on investment when they integrate electronic
connectivity into their standard processes. In addition, because so many
of the large providers are members, new payers that join could see a
large proportion of their Massachusetts membership start using
electronic transaction.
In addition to providing significant value to new and existing members
due to the high penetration of the marketplace, the NEHEN model has at
its core several key principles that significantly differentiate it from
the usual healthcare electronic commerce model. These core differences
are a flat fee for membership without transaction-based charges and
collaboration to share innovations in administrative simplification.
The flat fee is perhaps the most significant because it provides an
incentive for every member to raise its own transaction volumes. Over
time, the per transaction cost to the most active of the NEHEN provider
members has already dropped to $.05 per transaction with just
eligibility being traded today. As upcoming transactions are created and
come online, this cost will drop even further, to a projected $.02 -
$.03 per transaction later this year. When this is compared to the
typical $.35 - $.40 per transaction charged by a clearinghouse for this
service, it becomes clear that the NEHEN model allows most of the value
gained by the electronic transaction exchange to remain inside the
healthcare system with the payers and providers and the value doesn’t
leave the system and go to the clearinghouse or other third-party. As an
example, a specialty hospital in Massachusetts with 300,000 patient
visits per year will minimally use five electronic transactions to
support each claim (eligibility and referral inquiries, claims
submission, remittance advice, and actual payment). Under the NEHEN
model, the hospital would keep at least $450,000 more of the
administrative cost savings than under a clearinghouse model because
they would be paying $.30 less per transaction.
When NEHEN formed, the members decided that in order to achieve
electronic trading at large volume they needed to act collaboratively
rather than competitively. In addition to agreeing to standards and
employing a common program management to help drive decisions, the
members donate software developed to solve a specific member problem to
the NEHEN consortium for use by other members. This sharing of the
development cost has greatly lowered the bar to entry for provider
organizations that are often cash poor and prefer to concentrate their
resources on providing clinical care rather than administration.
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