Testimony
of
Linda J. Connell
Director
NASA Aviation Safety
Reporting System
Before the
Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations
Committee on Veterans’
Affairs
House of
Representatives
July 27, 2000
Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Subcommittee,
I am pleased to respond to your request
for information on the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). The
ASRS is a model for voluntary, confidential, non-punitive safety
reporting that has been contributing to aviation safety since 1976. I
would like to discuss some aspects of its applicability to the current
efforts surrounding the improvement of healthcare within the
Department of Veterans’ Affairs (VA), Veterans Health Administration
(VHA) and the recent Interagency Agreement between the VA and NASA in
May of this year.
After the creation of the VHA Expert
Advisory Panel on Patient Safety in 1998, NASA was asked to join this
prestigious panel and present information on the ASRS. I was very
pleased to participate and share the many proactive safety activities
that the ASRS is able to perform for aviation. The ASRS is a highly
successful and trusted program that has served the needs of the
aviation community for 24 years. It is available to all participants
in the National Aviation System who wish to report safety incidents
and situations. The ASRS was established in 1976 under an agreement
between the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and NASA. This
cooperative safety program invites pilots, air traffic controllers,
flight attendants, maintenance personnel, and others to voluntarily
report to NASA any actual or potential hazard to safe aviation
operations. The FAA‘s Office of System Safety provides most of the
ASRS program’s funding. NASA Ames Research Center administers the
program, assures confidentiality, receives all reports submitted to
the program, and sets policies in conjunction with the FAA and a
fifteen member industry Advisory Committee.
The ASRS collects and responds to these
voluntarily submitted incident reports, using this information to
lessen the likelihood of aviation accidents. ASRS data are used to
identify aviation system deficiencies for correction by appropriate
authorities, support aviation system policy, contribute to planning
and improvements, and strengthen the foundation of aviation human
factors safety research.
ASRS reporters are protected when they
report to this system. NASA and the FAA offer those who use the ASRS
program two important reporting guarantees: confidentiality and
limited immunity. These guarantees, as expressed in Federal Aviation
Regulation 14 CFR 91.25 and FAA Advisory Circular 00-46D, are offered
because this type of safety information is unique, and its value can
only be obtained as a result of the confidence and trust placed in the
program by the reporters. A NASA preaddressed and postage-free form,
NASA ARC 277A-D, is used by the aviation reporters to submit
information. The reports sent to the ASRS are held in strict
confidence. More than 470,000 reports have been submitted since the
program’s beginning, without a single reporter’s identity being
revealed. The ASRS removes all personal names and other potentially
identifying information before entering reports into its database.
Currently, the ASRS program is receiving approximately 36,000 reports
annually.
Reporters to ASRS are also guaranteed
limited immunity by the FAA. This means that the FAA will not use, nor
will NASA provide, information that has been filed with the ASRS in an
enforcement action. Fines and penalties for unintentional violations
of Federal Aviation Regulations will be waived, as long as violations
are reported within 10 days. However, accidents and criminal
activities are not protected from enforcement actions, and should not
be submitted to the ASRS. In addition to the immunity provisions
associated with the ASRS program, reporters often mention other
equally important motivations for using the program. The reporters
feel increased satisfaction in knowing that they are helping to
improve the aviation system by giving safety information to the ASRS,
significantly increasing understanding of the factors contributing to
safety incidents.
I would like to emphasize that the ASRS
is a unique safety information system. No other such national
reporting system, voluntary or mandatory, delivers the complete
standard of confidentiality and anonymity provided by the ASRS
program. An indication of the importance of confidentiality is
provided by the fact that over 70% of the reports in the ASRS database
contain statements revealing human error information. It is not
unusual for reporters to discuss their own operational mistakes—mistakes
they would never even mention to others (e.g., other Government
Agencies or organizations), let alone explain the reasons why the
incidents occurred. Confidential incident reporting provides an
insight into events from the human perspective that can rarely be
obtained through other methods.
The successful longevity of the ASRS
and its continuing trust and strength arise from several factors.
First and foremost is the promise of confidentiality, which is further
reinforced by the 24-year history of proven ability to protect the
identity of a reporter. The next important factor is the program’s
independence, both actual and perceived. NASA’s involvement, as the
"honest broker" between the regulator and the reporter, has
been a significant reason that the ASRS has been trusted and that the
reports received are honest appraisals of the performance of the
reporter and others in the aviation system. NASA is a research
organization with no regulatory authority and, therefore, is perceived
as a safe place to report sensitive, possibly self-incriminating,
information. NASA’s distinct position, as an independent Government
Agency with a strong influence on aviation safety policy and practice,
has been invaluable in instilling trust in the ASRS.
Another important factor is the
creation of the ASRS Advisory Committee. This body has assisted the
ASRS by providing substantial advocacy, guidance concerning ASRS
policy, assurance to reporter communities of bona fide
confidentiality, and support for improvements in safety as a result of
incident reports. This Advisory Committee has been very crucial from
the initial steps of the creation of the ASRS and throughout its
history. The Advisory Committee attempts to represent all potential
reporter communities, as well as other industry organizations and
government. Currently, this group exists under the NASA Aero-Space
Technology Advisory Committee as the ASRS Advisory Subcommittee.
The Advisory Committee has
substantially assisted the ASRS in providing another crucial factor
important for its success. The importance of feedback to the reporter
communities must not be underestimated. The ability of the ASRS
program to convert the aviation community’s report input into
constructive output is evidenced by the many products produced by the
ASRS (see Attachments A & B and http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov
). The ASRS has released 2,500 alert messages concerning potential
hazards and important occurrences. Approximately 42% of the alert
addressee responses indicate that a follow-up action was taken as a
result of the safety alert message. A monthly newsletter, CALLBACK, is
distributed to over 88,000 recipients and captures and presents safety
information from the incidents received by ASRS. The participation of
ASRS at significant safety organizational meetings, conventions, and
workshops continues to reinforce the participation by these
communities. The reporters can see evidence that information provided
is utilized for constructive changes to improve safety.
As we begin to apply the aviation model
to the VHA and its current quality improvements efforts, it is
noteworthy that the ASRS model has already been widely accepted by
other aviation systems around the world. There are currently seven
countries that have begun operating voluntary, confidential incident
reporting systems. In addition to the United States, participating
nations include the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Russia, Taiwan,
and Korea. These countries have preserved the concepts of voluntary
and confidential reporting as key characteristics necessary to assure
the filing of reports. Although most countries have provisions for
"use immunity" (i.e., prohibition from use in enforcement
action), none have "transactional immunity" (i.e., waiver of
disciplinary action). All countries are, however, very aware of the
necessity of confidentiality for the continuing viability of their
systems. The vital role of confidentiality was graphically
demonstrated when one nation’s system collapsed, due to a dramatic
decrease in reporting after a reporter’s identity was revealed.
In assuring protection of a reporter’s
identity, methods for de-identification of reports are crucial. The
ASRS employs aviation experts as its report analysts. These people
are, in fact, retired aviation professionals, including pilots, air
traffic controllers, flight attendants, and mechanics—all of whom
have had lengthy careers in aviation. Analysts examine each report and
maximize the pertinent safety information available within the report.
The ASRS system (as opposed to one which has anonymous reporting) has
the capability of contacting incident reporters and obtaining
additional information, as well as discussing safety events with
reporters. When these interactions occur, it is a matter of event
reporters talking with individuals having comparable professional
training and experience—pilots talking to pilots, controllers
talking to controllers, etc. This collegiality produces an increase in
the validity of the data. Analysts are able to find out the
"why" of the event, not just a terse description.
Consequently, the narrative section of the report record is quite
complete in its description of the event, as well as the inclusion of
key words and coding to facilitate subsequent retrieval from the
electronic database.
In addition to providing expertise and
quality assurance, ASRS analysts are able to reliably remove
information that might identify a reporter. The ASRS places its
highest priority on this protection. The goal is to remove enough
information to protect the reporter while at the same time preserving
the safety message, in the actual words of the person reporting. This
process of de-identification also relates to other topics of interest,
such as the public release of information and legal discovery. The
ASRS database includes only the information that has been determined
to be most important. Due to limited resources, the ASRS performs a
type of triage to determine which reports will be fully analyzed for
inclusion in the database. Once these data are placed in the database,
it is accessible to the public through the ASRS Search Request
process, an internet site managed by the FAA (http://nasdac.faa.gov/safety_data),
or through a private CD-ROM product available on the market. The ASRS
has accomplished over 5,800 database searches for government agencies,
students, research organizations, international organizations,
aircraft manufacturers, etc. The FAA is the top requester of the ASRS
information. Often, we are asked for information through the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA), but recourse to this statute is not needed,
since NASA’s ASRS database is already openly available.
As for legal issues, incidents reported
to ASRS rarely involve negligence and liability, often inherent in
more serious events, such as accidents. After being rapidly
de-identified, a narrative may be augmented in various ways. For
example, analysts may add additional clarifying language. Also, a
report from one reporter (e.g., a Captain) will be paired with other
reports (e.g., a First Officer) describing the same event. Through
such procedures, the content of the original report may to a certain
extent be altered. Accordingly, ASRS has been informed that such
alteration renders a report "hearsay evidence," due to its
lack of an identifiable source, and therefore of less interest in
legal proceedings. In some cases, for example, database reports have
actually been used to defend a pilot. Instead of using information
against an individual, data may be used to illustrate a potential
system flaw that may also have victimized a number of other persons.
Therefore, when event reporters do choose to share their experience
with the ASRS, they are not faced with the added threat of
complicating their own, or their employers’, legal position. The
de-identification process has been quite effective in driving out fear
of incident reporting.
It is important to note that the ASRS
is not an investigative system. The information contained in
reports is evaluated carefully by experts, but the confidentiality
requirements of the system make it impossible to obtain third party
verification. The information relating to the existence and character
of a phenomenon is relayed to the appropriate organizations in a
manner that permits and encourages them to investigate the safety
issue further and seek a solution. Alternatively, they may implement
interim procedures to accommodate the phenomenon until a solution can
be identified and instituted.
We firmly believe that the ASRS
incident database is the most authoritative source of human
performance information that exists in aviation today. This program is
a paradigm that can be utilized in many other disciplines.
The current NASA/ASRS effort to
establish a new external reporting system with the VHA, entitled the
Patient Safety Reporting System (PSRS), will be a challenge as well as
an opportunity. The ASRS model will serve as a starting point for the
proposed voluntary reporting system. However, the significant
operational and structural differences between the health care
environment and the field of aviation may present challenges for the
PSRS system. It may well be necessary to develop VHA approaches that
differ from those employed by the ASRS, but the salient
characteristics of the ASRS will be captured so as to provide the
maximal relevant information. The three-year agreement between the VA
and NASA will explore how such differences impact the implementation
of confidential and de-identified patient safety-related reporting
within the VA health care system. This approach is intended to provide
the most efficient path to discovering the benefits of voluntary,
confidential reporting in health care settings. The VA and NASA are
uniquely positioned to embrace this challenge. The opportunity for
both NASA and the VA is to gain new insights into the nature of human
performance in the complex and dynamic environment of medicine,
exploring the best means of optimizing safety in patient care.
Potential benefits have not only an immediate application to VA/VHA
care of veterans but also long-term relevance to health care in
general.
Thank you for providing me with this
opportunity to present information on the Aviation Safety Reporting
System, outlining our accomplishments in the effort to bring about
improvements in aviation safety. NASA will be pleased to provide any
further information that you may request.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the
Subcommittee, this concludes my testimony. I will be happy to respond
to your questions.
Aviation Safety
Reporting System
Significant
Program Safety Products
January 10, 2000
The following is a listing of the
variety of safety products that were accomplished by the NASA ASRS
staff:
General
Accomplishments
• Since the implementation of the
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) in 1976, over 474,000
reports have been submitted by pilots, mechanics, air traffic
controllers, cabin attendants, and other aviation personnel.
• The ASRS is the largest
repository of aviation human factors incidents in the world.
• The ASRS has an unblemished
record of never breaching reporter confidentiality.
• The ASRS has accomplished over
5,800 database searches for government agencies, students, research
organizations, international organizations, aircraft manufacturers,
etc.
• Since 1976, the ASRS has issued
over 2,500 safety alert messages in the form of Alert Bulletins
& For Your Information Notices. Approximately, 42% of the
addressee responses indicated that a follow-up action was taken as a
result of the safety alert message.
Operational Impacts
• Identified and alerted the FAA
Office of Aviation Safety & the NTSB to the wake vortices caused
by B757 aircraft. Consequently, the FAA issued a directive requiring
increased separation behind B757 aircraft and the issuance of wake
turbulence advisories.
• Identified and alerted the FAA
Office of Aviation Safety & the Air Transport Association to the
affects of passenger electronic devices on air carrier communication
& navigation systems.
• Issued an ASRS Alert Bulletin to
the aircraft manufacturer that concerned an L-1011 electrical fire.
The manufacturer subsequently issued a Flight Operations Advisory
Bulletin to all L-1011 operators.
• Issued an ASRS Alert Bulletin to
the air traffic managers at Los Angeles Control Tower and the
Southern California TRACON concerning close-in instrument approach
changes. The FAA collaborated with various manufacturers to
implement a flight management system (FMS) program modification that
would promptly display transitions to newly assigned runways.
• Issued an ASRS For Your
Information Notice concerning the airport lighting and general
conditions of the Pickens County Airport, Jasper, GA. The local FAA
Flight Standards office conducted an on-site inspection of the
airport and issued a warning notice to the Pickens County
Commissioner to take corrective actions within 30 days of the
notice.
• Issued an ASRS For Your
Information Notice to the Airport Manager of Mitchell International
Airport, Milwaukee, WI concerning an unsafe runway incursion
incident. The airport authorities subsequently completed a project
to install flashing warning lights at key runway intersections.
• Issued an ASRS Alert Bulletin to
FAA Headquarters concerning a smoldering passenger's bag in a DC-10
aircraft that was caused by animal-shaped butane cigarette lighters.
The FAA subsequently issued a notice to airport security personnel
on the toy-shaped lighters.
NTSB Accident Support
• A database search of Jetstream-31
aircraft failure incidents was forwarded to the NTSB in conjunction
with the Jetstream-31 accident at Raleigh-Durham, NC.
• A database search of EMB-120
aircraft engine incidents was forwarded to the NTSB in conjunction
with the EMB-120 accident near Carrollton, GA.
• A database search of Colombian
airspace incidents were forwarded to the NTSB in conjunction with
the B757 accident near Cali, Colombia.
• Accomplished a database search
request for the NTSB in support of the investigation of the MD-11
accident near Halifax, Nova Scotia.
NASA/ASRS RESEARCH
IMPACT: A PARTIAL LISTING
|
NASA/ASRS Research
Product or Data |
Year |
Regulatory /
Operational Effects |
Cited In |
|
Human Factors Associated with
Runway Incursions, C.E.
Billings, NASA TM 78540 (ASRS QR#8). An analysis of ASRS
incident data. |
1978 |
Used as resource in NTSB and FAA
studies of runway transgressions; 1991 FAA study resulted in new
procedures and improved runway/taxi marking systems |
- Runway Incursions at
Controlled Airports in the United States,
NTSB
special Investigation Report, (NTSB.SIR-86/01).
- Runway Incursion Plan,
DOT/FAA
Associate Administrator for System Engineering and
Development, ARD-100, January 1991.
- Pilot Surface Incident Safety
Study,
David R.
Kelley and J. Glenn Steinbacher, MITRE, report prepared for
DOT/FAA Office of Integrated Safety Analysis under the
direction of the Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety
(March 1993).
|
|
Knowledge of the limitations of
the ATC system in conflict avoidance capabilities,
William P. Monan, NASA TM 81197. |
1978 |
|
- Altitude Deviation Study: A
Descriptive Analysis of Pilot and Controller Incidents ,
MiTech,
Inc. and Carlow Associates, DOT/FAA Research and Development
Service, Final Report, October 1992
|
|
Distraction–A Human Factor in
Air Carrier Hazard Events
(ASRS QR#9) |
1979 |
Provided data and motivation for
FARs Part 121.542 and Part 135.100, "Flight Crewmember
Duties" ("The Sterile Cockpit Rule") |
- Federal Register, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, Vol. 45, No. 169, August 28,
1980, p. 57684.
- Federal Register, Final
Rule, Vol. 46, No. 12, January 19, 1981, p. 5500.
- Flight Safety Digest
,
"Accident and Incident Reports Show Importance of Sterile
Cockpit Compliance," Vol. 13, No. 7, July 1994, 1-8.
|
|
NASA/ASRS Research
Product or Data |
Year |
Regulatory /
Operational Effects |
Cited In |
|
Probability Distributions of
Altitude Deviations, R.
Thomas and L. Rosenthal, NASA CR 166339. |
1982 |
First in-depth study of the
characteristics of altitude deviations in the ASRS database,
including geometry and distribution of altitude deviations. |
- Altitude Deviation Study: A
Descriptive Analysis of Pilot and Controller Incidents ,
MiTech,
Inc. and Carlow Associates, DOT/FAA Research and Development
Service, Final Report, October 1992.
|
|
Non-Airborne Conflicts: The
Causes and Effects of Runway Transgressions, Richard
J. Tarrel, NASA CR 177372. An analysis of ASRS incident data. |
1985 |
Used as resource in NTSB and FAA
studies of runway transgressions; 1991 FAA study resulted in new
procedures and improved runway/taxi marking systems |
- Runway Incursions at
Controlled Airports in the United States,
NTSB
special Investigation Report, (NTSB.SIR-86/01).
- Runway Incursion Plan,
DOT/FAA
Associate Administrator for System Engineering and
Development, ARD-100, January 1991.
- Pilot Surface Incident Safety
Study,
David R.
Kelley and J. Glenn Steinbacher, MITRE, report prepared for
DOT/FAA Office of Integrated Safety Analysis under the
direction of the Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety
(March 1993).
|
|
Human Factors in Aviation
Operations: The Hearback Problem,
William P. Monan, NASA CR 177398 |
March 1986 |
Motivated 1986 change to FAA Air
Traffic Control Handbook (Order 7110.65) requiring controllers
to ensure that pilot readbacks are correct. Also Introduced the
term "hearback" to the aviation community
(subsequently widely adopted); |
- FSF Accident Prevention
Bulletin
, Vol. 43,
No. 10 (3), October 1986, "The ‘Hearback’
Problem"
- Flight Safety Foundation
Accident Prevention
,
"My Own Mouth Shall Condemn Me, "Vol. 47, No. 6,
June 1990.
|
|
Cockpit or Cabin Crew
Coordination, Kim M.
Cardosi and M. Stephen Huntley, Jr., DOT/FAA/FS-88/1, Final
Report. Utilized ASRS data. |
February 1988 |
Motivated issuance of FAA
Advisory Circular 120-48 (7/13/88), "Communication and
Coordination Between Flight Crewmembers and Flight
Attendants" |
|
|
VFR Flight Near TCAs: Practices,
Perceptions & Problems,
R. Tarrel, et al (ASRS) |
November 1989 |
Study performed at request of FAA
Office of Aviation Safety; believed to have influenced
moderation of FAA enforcement posture toward General Aviation
pilots |
|
|
NASA/ASRS Research
Product or Data |
Year |
Regulatory /
Operational Effects |
Cited In |
|
Human Factors of Flight-Deck
Checklists: The Normal Checklist,
Asaf Degani and Earl Wiener, NASA CR 177549. Findings based on
ASRS data. |
1990 |
Published as a mandatory
requirement for all FAA inspectors that certify checklists
(1995); more than 2,400 copies requested by operational
community as the result of CALLBACK summary |
- Incorporated in FAA Advisory
Circular 120-64.
- NASA/ASRS CALLBACK
,
No. 136-137 (Sept-Oct 1990).
- Aviation Daily
,
November 5, 1990, p. 241.
- USAir Airwaves
,
December 1990, 12-13.
- Journal of flight engineers (Varig)
,
Vol. 17 (63), 1990.
- All Nippon Airlines Journal
,
No. 149, 17-21, 1991.
- Journal of the United Nations
Civil Aviation Organization
,
Vol. 46 (6), 18-21, 1991.
- Delta Airlines Safety
Newsletter
, Vol. 6
(1-2), 1991.
- Human Factors
,
Vol. 35, No. 2, June 1993, 345-359.
|
|
"Eliminating Pilot-Caused
Altitude Deviations: A Human Factors Approach," Robert L.
Sumwalt, in Proceedings of the Sixth International Symposium
on Aviation Psychology, The Ohio State University. |
1991 |
Described genesis of USAir’s
Altitude Awareness Program and usefulness of ASRS data in this
enterprise. |
- "The Development of an
Altitude Awareness Program: An Integrated Approach,"
Thomas M. Granada, Carlow Associates; Capt. Donald H.
McClure, ALPA; Capt. James W. Fogarty, USAir, paper
presented at the Human Factors Society Meeting, 1991.
- Altitude Deviation Study: A
Descriptive Analysis of Pilot and Controller Incidents ,
MiTech,
Inc. and Carlow Associates, DOT/FAA Research and Development
Service, Final Report, October 1992.
|
|
The Use and Design of Flightcrew
Checklists and Manuals, John
W. Turner and M. Stephen Huntley, Jr., U.S. DOT Research and
Special Programs Administration, Final Report. Findings based on
ASRS data. |
April 1991 |
Study was supported by six Part
121 and nine Part 135 carriers, and an ALPA survey. Contained
recommendations for formatting and content of checklists and
manuals, and use by flight crews. |
|
|
NASA/ASRS Research
Product or Data |
Year |
Regulatory /
Operational Effects |
Cited In |
|
"One Zero Ways to Bust an
Altitude," Donald George, ASRS Directline. Review of
ASRS data on altitude deviations. |
Fall 1991 |
Distribution to an estimated
50,000+ pilots in US. and foreign operations |
- United Airlines excerpted
portions of article and distributed to all of its 9,000
pilots in a United Airlines Flight Safety Brief. UAL
also reproduced a graphic from the article and made it into
a poster for company-wide distribution.
- Article reprinted by TWA,
USAir, New Zealand Air, GATCO, Commercial Aviation Safety
(UK), and Focus on Commercial Aviation.
|
|
"Air Carrier Ground
Deicing/Anti-Icing Problems," Robert L. Sumwalt, in Proceedings
of the Seventh International Symposium on Aviation Psychology,
The Ohio State University. Review of ASRS data on ground deicing
operations. The author summarized the results of this research
in personal correspondence to the FAA in April 1993, in response
to Docket No. 26930 (interim NPRM). |
April 1993 |
FAA Advisory Circular 120-60
(5/19/94) contained a provision recommended by the ASRS study
and its author requiring an outside-the-aircraft check for icing
contamination. |
- "Aircraft Ground Deicing
Problems: Recommendations from Analysis of ASRS Incident
Data," SAE Ground Deicing Conference Transcription of
Proceedings, June 15-17, 1993, Salt Lake City, Utah.
- "Incident Reports
Highlight Problems Involving Air Carrier Ground
Deicing/Anti-icing," Robert L. Sumwalt, FSF Airport
Operations, Vol. 19, No. 5, September/October 1993.
|
|
A Review and Discussion of Flight
Management System Incidents Reported to the Aviation Safety
Reporting System, Donald
Eldredge, Susan Mangold, and Robert Dodd, U.S. DOT/FAA Research
and Development Service. Analysis of ASRS FMA-related database
reports |
February 1992 |
Frequently requested by air
carrier and aviation industry organizations |
|
|
On the Typography of Flight Deck
Documentation, Asaf
Degani, NASA CR 177605 |
December 1992 |
Published as a mandatory
requirement for all FAA inspectors that certify checklists
(1995); more than 800 copies requested by operational community
as the result of CALLBACK summary |
- Incorporated in FAA Advisory
Circular 120-64.
- Human Performance
Considerations in the Use and Design of Aircraft Checklists
.
Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Safety
Services-Safety Analysis Division, 1995.
- NASA/ASRS CALLBACK
,
No. 168 (May 1993).
|
|
On the Design of Flight Deck
Procedures, Asaf Degani
and Earl Wiener, NASA CR 177642. Findings based on ASRS data. |
June 1994 |
Published as a mandatory
requirement for all FAA inspectors that certify checklists
(1995); 200 copies requested from NASA as the result of CALLBACK
summary |
- Incorporated in FAA Advisory
Circular 120-64.
- Human Performance
Considerations in the Use and Design of Aircraft Checklists
.
Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Safety
Services-Safety Analysis Division, 1995.
- NASA/ASRS CALLBACK
,
No. 184 (Sept 1994).
|
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